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From Boolean Logic to high order 
predicate modal logic
Boolean Logic
= Propositional logic
Modal 
Propositional logic
First-Order Logic  = 
Predicate logic
Modal Predicate 
logic
High-Order Modal 
logic
From Boolean Logic to high order 
predicate modal logic
1. p
2. q
3. p/\q 4. p 5. q p 6. p (q p)
• As an illustration, consider the following proof 
which establishes the theorem p  (q  p):
7. q 8. p q 9. q(p q)

1. We shall be concerned, at first, with alethic
modal logic, or modal logic tout court.
2. The starting point, once again, is Aristotle, who 
was the first to study the relationship between 
modal statements and their validity.
3. However, the great discussion it enjoyed in the 
Middle Ages.
4. The official birth date of modal logic is 1921, 
when Clarence Irving Lewis wrote a famous 
essay on implication.
Modal logics has Roots in C. 
I. Lewis
• As is widely known and much celebrated, C. I. Lewis invented 
modal logic.
• Modal logic sprang in no small part from his disenchantment 
with material implication
– Material implication was accepted and indeed taken as central in Principia 
by Russell and Whitehead. 
• In the modern propositional calculus (PC), implication is of this 
sort; 
• hence a statement like
– “ If the moon is composed of Jarlsberg cheese, then 
Selmer is Norwegian" is symbolized by
p  q;
where of course the propositional variables can vary with 
personal choice.
Aristotle
St. Anselm
C.I. Lewis
Saul Kripke
Modern 
Engineering 
Temporal Logic 
and Model 
Checking
Troubles with 
material 
conditional 
(material implication)
It is known that p  q is true, by 
definition of material implication, for all 
possible combinations of the truth-values 
of p and q, except when p is true and q is 
false.
p q p  q
T T T
T F F
F T T
F F T
• it is possible that both p and ¬q are true
One may use 
this F in next 
parts of proof
One may use true 
consequent from 
false antecedent
1. The truth-table defining  may raise some doubts, especially 
when we “compare” it with the intuitive notion of implication.
2. In order to clarify the issue, Lewis introduced the notion of strict 
implication, and with it the symbol of a new logical connective: 
• According to Lewis –
the implication
p q requires that
• it is impossible that both p and ¬q are true
or
• it is necessary that p q
Dorothy 
Edgington’s Proof 
of the Existence of 
God
Just one 
example
Material 
implication
I do not pray
So God exists
Let us use material 
implication to analyze this 
reasoning
Dorothy Edgington’s Proof of Existence 
of God
• If God does not exist, then it is not the case that if 
I pray, my prayers will be answered
G   ( P  A) = G (P   A)
 G   (P  A)
• We use elimination of material implication twice
• “I do not pray” so we substitute P=0
G  (P   A) = G  (0   A)   = G  0  = G 
• So God exists.
De Morgan
Eric is quilty and Eric did not have an 
accomplice
Therefore Eric is quilty
Other example of troubles with 
material implication
The modal operator 
• Lewis introduced the modal operator 
1.  means possible
2. in order to present his preferred sort of 
implication: 
3. Lewis implication is called strict implication. 
p  q
Material 
implication
  (p   q)
Strict Implication
It is not possible that m is true and s is 
not true
not possible


Modal 
Logic
Modal Logic: basic operators
1. We take from propositional logic all
operators, variables, axioms, proof rules, 
etc.
2. We add two modal operators:
–  reads    “ is necessarily true”
–  reads  “ is possibly true”
3. Equivalence:
–     
–      
Modal Logic: Possible and necessary
Modal Equivalence:
    
– Sentence “ it is possible that it will rain in afternoon” is 
equivalent to the sentence “it is not necessary that it will not 
rain in afternoon”
– Sentence “ it is possible that this Boolean function is 
satisfied” is equivalent to the sentence “it is not necessary 
that this Boolean function is not satisfied”.
ab\cd
00 01 11 10
00 1 0 1 0
01 0 0 0 0
11 0 0 0 0
10 0 0 0 0
ab\cd
00 01 11 10
00 0 0 0 0
01 0 0 0 0
11 0 0 0 0
10 0 0 0 0
Tautology, non-satisfiability and 
contingence
ab\cd
00 01 11 10
00 1 1 1 1
01 1 1 1 1
11 1 1 1 1
10 1 1 1 1
ab\cd
00 01 11 10
00 0 0 0 0
01 0 0 0 0
11 0 0 0 0
10 0 0 0 0
ab\cd
00 01 11 10
00 0 0 0 0
01 0 1 0 0
11 0 0 0 0
10 0 0 0 0
ab\cd
00 01 11 10
00 1 1 1 1
01 1 0 1 1
11 1 1 1 1
10 1 1 1 1
Tautology is true in 
every world
Not satisfied is 
false in every 
world
not
Contingent is not always false and not 
always true 
Modal Logic: Possible and necessary
Another Modal Equivalence:
     
1. So we can use only one of the two operators, 
for instance “necessary”
2. But it is more convenient to use two operators.
3. Next we will be using even more than two 
operators, but the understanding of these two 
is crucial.
Both operators, that of necessity  and that of possibility , can be reciprocally 
defined.
If we take  as primitive, we have:
p := ¬¬p
that is
“it is necessary that p” means 
“it is not possible that  non-p”
Therefore, we can define strict implication as:
p q := (¬p Λ q)
but since p  q is logically equivalent to ¬(p Λ ¬q), or (¬p Λ q), we 
have
p q := (p q)
Reciprocal definition and 
strict implication
1. Modal logic is not a multiple-valued logic
2. Modal logic is not fuzzy logic.
3. Modal logic is not a probabilistic logic.
4. Modal logic is a symbolic logic
5. Algebraic models for modal logic are still a research issue
6. In fuzzy of MV logic operation on uncertainties creates other 
uncertainties, better or worse but never certainties
7. In modal logic you can derive certainties from uncertainties
Uncertain values certain values
0
1
0
1
?
?
0
1
Modal logic is different from other logics
?
?
0
1
Modal 
processing
TYPES 
OF 
MODAL 
LOGIC
TYPES OF MODAL LOGIC
Modal logic is extremely important  both for its philosophical 
applications and in order to clarify the terms and conditions of 
arguments.
The label “modal logic” refers to a variety of logics:
1. alethic modal logic, dealing with statements such as
• “It is necessary that p”, 
• “It is possible that p”, 
• etc.
2. epistemic modal logic, that deals with statements such as
• “I know that p”, 
• “I believe that p”,
• etc.
TYPES OF MODAL LOGIC (cont)
3. deontic modal logic, dealing with statements such as 
• “It is compulsory that p”, 
• “It is forbidden that p”, 
• “It is permissible that p”, etc
4. temporal modal logic, dealing with statements such as 
• “It is always true that p”, 
• “It is sometimes true that p”, etc.
5. ethical modal logic, dealing with statements such as
• “It is good that p”, 
• “It is bad that p”
Syntax of 
Modal Logic
Syntax of Modal Logic (□ and ◊)
Formulae in (propositional) Modal Logic ML:
• The Language of ML contains the Language of 
Propositional Calculus, i.e. if P is a formula in 
Propositional Calculus, then P is a formula in ML.
• If  and  are formulae in ML, then  
, , , , □, ◊ *
• are also formulae in ML.
* Note: The operator ◊ is often later introduced and defined through □ .
Modal Logic: 
circuits
• Remember that 
–   , 
– and     ( )
– and     
Is equivalent to 


  ( )



Is equivalent to 


necessary
possible
De Morgan
Modal Logic: circuits
Is equivalent to 





Is equivalent to 
 
People who are familiar with classical logic, 
Boolean Logic and circuits, automatic theorem 
proving, automata and robotics can bring 
substantial contributions to modal logic.
1. Circuits are the same as formulas
2. But these circuits are symbolic, 
values cannot be propagated, only 
substitutions can be made
Proof Rules for 
Modal Logic
Proof Rules for Modal Logic
1. Modal Generalization 
A
A
2. Monotonicity of 
A  B
 A   B
3. Monotonicity of 
A  B
A B
An Axiom System for Prepositional Logic
• (A  (B  C))  (A  B)  (A  C)
• A  (B  A)
• (( A  false )  false )  A
• Modus Ponens
A, A -> B
B
An Axiom System for 
Predicate Logic
• x (A(x)  B(x))  (xA(x)  xB(x))
• x A(x)  A[t/x] provided t is free for x in A
• A  x A(x) provided x is not free in A
• Modus Ponens
A, A  B
B
• Generalization 
A
x A(x)
Valid and Invalid formulas in  Modal 
Logic
• A couple of Valid Modal Formulas:
–  (A  B )  ( A)  ( B)
– (A  B )  (A)  (B)
• [](A  B )  ([] A)  ([] B) in brackets we can put various 
modal operators
• [K](A  B )  ([K] A)  ([K] B)    for instance here we put 
knowledge operator
–  (false) (false)
– ( A)  (B)   (A  B ) 
• Example of an invalid modal formula
– ( A)  (A )
X's proof system as an example of 
modal software
1. There are several computer tools for proving, verifying, and 
creating theorems.
2. nuSMV, Molog, X.
3. X's proof system ( a set of programs) for the propositional calculus 
includes :
1. the Gentzen-style introduction 
2. and elimination rules, 
1. as well as some rules, 
2. such as ”De Morgan's Laws," 
3. that are formally redundant, 
4. but quite useful to have on hand.
• A proof in first order logic 
showing that if everyone likes 
someone, the domain is {a; b}, 
and a does not like b, then a 
likes himself. 
• In step 5, z is used as an 
arbitrary name. 
• Step 13 discharges 5 since 12 
depends on 5, but on no 
assumption in which z is free.
• In step 12, assumptions 7 and 
9, corresponding to the 
disjuncts of 6, are discharged 
by \/ elimination.
• Step 11 the principle that, in 
classical logic, everything 
follows from a contradiction.
the domain is {a; b} 
everyone likes someone
a does not like b
a likes himself Example of proof in predicate logic
Examples of proofs in modal logic
Example of 
Knowledge Base and 
reasoning in FOL
• Not only logic system is important 
but also the strategy of solving
1. Forward chaining
2. Backward chaining
3. Resolution
Knowledge Base: example
1. According to American Law, selling weapons to a 
hostile nation is a crime
2. The state of Nono, is an enemy, it has some 
missiles
3. All missiles were sold to Nono by colonel West, 
who is an American
4. Prove that colonel West is a criminal
Knowledge Base:
1. . . . Selling weapons to a hostile nation by an American is a crime:
– American(x) ^ Weapon(y) ^ Sells(x, y, z) ^ Hostile(z)  Criminal(x)
2. Nono . . . Has some missiles, i.e. Exists x Owns(Nono, x) ^Missile(x):
– Owns(Nono, M1) ^ Missile(M1)
3. . . . All missiles were sold to Nono by colonel West
– ForAll x Missile(x) ^ Owns(Nono, x)  Sells(West, x, Nono)
4. Missiles are weapons:
– Missile(x) Weapon(x)
5. Enemy of America is Hostile:
– Enemy(x, America)  Hostile(x)
6. West, is an American. . .
– American(West)
7. State Nono, is an enemy of America.. . .
– Enemy(Nono, America)
Forward Chaining: example
Forward Chaining: example
Forward Chaining: example
Backward Chaining: example
Backward Chaining: example
Backward Chaining: example
Backward Chaining: example
Backward Chaining: example
Backward Chaining: example
Backward Chaining: example
Resolution: example
Now, knowing classical logic and modal 
logic we move to model checking
Muddy 
Children 
Problem
The Muddy Children Puzzle
1. n children meet their father after playing in the mud. The 
father notices that k of the children have mud dots on their 
foreheads. 
2. Each child sees everybody else’s foreheads, but not his own.
3. The father says: “At least one of you has mud on his 
forehead.”
4. The father then says: “Do any of you know that you have 
mud on your forehead? If you do, raise your hand now.”
5. No one raises his hand.
6. The father repeats the question, and again no one moves.
7. After exactly k repetitions, all children with muddy foreheads 
raise their hands simultaneously.
Muddy Children (k=1)
• Suppose k = 1
• The muddy child knows the 
others are clean
• When the father says at least 
one is muddy, he concludes 
that it’s him
Muddy Children (k=2)
• Suppose k = 2
• Suppose you are muddy
• After the first announcement, you see 
another muddy child, so you think 
perhaps he’s the only muddy one.
• But you note that this child did not raise 
his hand, and you realize you are also 
muddy.
• So you raise your hand in the next round, 
and so does the other muddy child
Multiple Worlds
and
The Partition Model 
of Knowledge
• Suppose there are two propositions p and q
• There are 4 possible worlds:
– w1: p  q
– w2: p   q
– w3:  p  q
– w4:  p   q
• Suppose the real world is w1, and that in w1 agent i
cannot distinguish between w1 and w2
• We say that Ii(w1) = {w1, w2}
– This means, in world w1 agent i cannot distinguish between 
world w1 and world w2
Example of worlds
Function I describes non-distinguishability of worlds
Worlds and non-distinguishability of worlds
W = {w1 , w2 , w3 , w4 } is the set of all worlds
W = set of all worlds for Muddy Children with 
two children
• This is knowledge of child 2
w1
w3
w4
w2
Partition model when children see one another 
but before father speaks
Ii(w1) = {w1, w2}
• This is knowledge of child 2
w1
w3 w4
w2
Ii(w1) = {w1, w2}
A = Partition Model of knowledge, partition of worlds in the set of 
all worlds W  
• What is partition of worlds?
– Each Ii is a partition of W for agent i
• Remember: a partition chops a set into disjoint sets
• Ii(w) includes all the worlds in the partition of world w
• Intuition:
– if the actual world is w, then Ii(w) is the set of worlds that agent i cannot 
distinguish from w
– i.e. all worlds in Ii(w), all possible as far as i knows
The Knowledge 
Operator
It describes the knowledge of an agent
1. By Ki we will denote that:
“agent i knows that ”
What is Logical Entailment?
• Let us give a definition:
– We say A,w |= Ki if and only ifw’, 
if w’Ii(w), then A,w |= 
Intuition: in partition model A, if the actual world is 
w, agent i knows  if and only if  is true in all 
worlds he cannot distinguish from w
w w2
w1
w3

w w2
w1
w3




Agent I cannot 
distinguish these 
worlds
Actual world
entails
Muddy 
Children 
Revisited
Now we have all background to illustrate solution to 
Muddy Children
Example of Knowledge Operator for Muddy Children
Bold oval = actual world
Solid boxes = equivalence classes in I1
Dotted boxes = equivalence classes in I2
Note: in w1 we have:
K1 muddy2
K2 muddy1
K1  K2 muddy2
…
But we don’t have:
K1 muddy1
Partition for agent 2 (what 
child 2 knows)
Partition for agent 1
Partitioning all possible worlds for agents in case of Two 
Muddy Children
Child 1 but not child 2 
knows that child 2 is 
muddy
1. w1: muddy1  muddy2     (actual 
world)
2. w2: muddy1   muddy2
3. w3:  muddy1  muddy2
4. w4:  muddy1   muddy2
Knowledge 
operators
Now we will consider stages of Muddy 
Children after each statement from father
• The father says: “At least one of you has mud 
on his forehead.”
– This eliminates the world:
w4:  muddy1   muddy2
Modification to knowledge and partitions done by 
the announcement of the father
1. w1: muddy1  muddy2     (actual 
world)
2. w2: muddy1   muddy2
3. w3:  muddy1  muddy2
4. w4:  muddy1   muddy2
Muddy Children after first father’s announcement
Bold oval = actual world
Solid boxes = equivalence classes in I1
Dotted boxes = equivalence classes in I2
Now, after father’s 
announcement,  the children 
have only three options:
1. Other child is muddy
2. I am muddy
3. We are both muddy
For instance in I2 we see that 
child 2 thinks as follows:
1. Either we are both muddy
2. Or he (child1) is muddy and 
I  (child 2) am not muddy
1. The same for Child 1
2. So each partition has more 
than one world and none of 
children can communicate 
any decision
1. w1: muddy1  muddy2     (actual world)
2. w2: muddy1   muddy2
3. w3:  muddy1  muddy2
4. w4:  muddy1   muddy2
Muddy Children after second father’s 
announcement
Bold oval = actual world
Solid boxes = equivalence classes in I1
Dotted boxes = equivalence classes in I2
Note: in w1 we have:
K1 muddy1
K2 muddy2
K1 K2 muddy2
…
1. Child  1 knows he is 
muddy
2. Child 2 knows he is 
muddy
3. Both children know they 
are muddy
1. w1: muddy1  muddy2     (actual 
world)
2. w2: muddy1   muddy2
3. w3:  muddy1  muddy2
4. w4:  muddy1   muddy2
Muddy Children 
Revisited
Again
with 3 children
Back to initial example: n = 3, k = 2
• An arrow labeled A (B, C resp.) linking two states indicates that A (B, C 
resp.) cannot distinguish between the states (reflexive arrows indicate 
that every agent considers the actual state possible). 
• Initial situation:
Note that at every state, each agent cannot distinguish between two states
In our model, we will not only draw states of logic variables in each world, 
but also some relations between the worlds, as related to knowledge of each agent 
(child). These are non-distinguishability relations for each agent A, B, C
An arrow labeled A 
linking two states 
indicates that A cannot 
distinguish between 
the states
State of A
State of B
State of C
This is a situation before 
any announcement of 
father
New information (father talks) removes some worlds 
with their labels on arrows
ccc eliminated
Green color means that 
the agent is certain
States mmc, ccm and cmc are 
removed from set of worlds
This is a situation after 
first announcement of 
father
Reduction of the set of worlds
This is a situation after 
second announcement 
of father
Reduction of the set of worlds
• After third announcement of father, states mmc , 
cmm and mcm are eliminated and only state mmm
becomes possible
This is a situation after 
second announcement 
of father
Final Reduction of the set of worlds after third 
announcement of father
only state mmm
becomes possible
This is a situation after 
third  announcement of 
father
Father tells “at least 
one of you is 
muddy”
Father tells second 
time  “at least one 
of you is muddy”
Father tells third 
time  “at least one 
of you is muddy”
World before father tells anything World after first father’s announcement
World after second father’s 
announcement
World after third father’s 
announcement
What are different worlds and how to go from world to world?
Muddy 1
Muddy 2
Muddy 3
Child 1 shouts 
“I am muddy”
Child 2 shouts 
“I am muddy”
Child 3 shouts 
“I am muddy”
No single 
Child  shouted
Child 1 shouts 
“I am muddy”
Child 2 shouts 
“I am muddy”
Child 3 shouts 
“I am muddy”
exor
exor
exor No two Children  
shouted
K1 muddy1
K2 muddy2
K3 muddy3
ab\c 0 1
00 If  none If  one
01 If  one If two
11 If two If 
three
10 If  one If two
If one child muddy
If  two children muddy
Three  Children  
shouted
Before father tells that at 
least one child is muddy
If one child would be 
muddy
Multi-level Boolean Circuit 
model for 3 Muddy Children
Karnaugh Map
Variants of Muddy Children
1. We need to know time interval, expected for 
everyone to respond
– This leads to temporal logic
2. We need mutual communication between 
agents
– This leads to dynamic logic, public announcement 
logic or other types of logic
Kripke and 
Semantics of 
Modal Logic
Modal Logic: Semantics
• Semantics is given in terms of Kripke
Structures (also known as possible 
worlds structures)
• Due to American logician Saul Kripke, 
City University of NY
• A Kripke Structure is (W, R)
– W is a set of possible worlds
– R : W  W is an binary accessibility 
relation over W
– This relation tells us how worlds are 
accessed from other worlds
1. We already introduced two close to one another 
ways of representing such set of possible worlds.
2. There will be many more.
Saul Kripke
He was called “the 
greatest philosopher of 
the 20st century
Kripke Semantics of Modal Logic
• The “universe” seen as 
a collection of worlds.
• Truth defined “in each 
world”.
• Say U is the universe.
• I.e. each w  U is a 
prepositional or 
predicate model.
W1
W2
W3
W4
Kripke Semantics of Modal Logic
• W1 satisfies X if  X is 
satisfied in each world 
accessible from W1.
– If W3 and W4 satisfy X.
– Notation: 
• W1 |= X if and only if
W3 |= X and W4 |= X
• W1 satisfies  X if  X is 
satisfied in at least one 
world accessible from W1.
W1
W2
W3
W4
–Notation:
•W1 |=  X if and only if
–W3 |= X or W4 |= X
Modal Logic: 
Axiomatics of 
system K
Modal Logic: Axiomatics of 
system K
• Is there a set of minimal axioms that allows us to 
derive precisely all the valid sentences?
• Some well-known axioms of basic modal logic are:
1. Axiom(Classical) All propositional tautologies are 
valid
2. Axiom (K) ( ())  is valid
3. Rule (Modus Ponens) if  and  are valid, infer 
that  is valid
4. Rule (Necessitation) if  is valid, infer that  is 
valid
These are enough, but many other 
can be added for convenience
K  for Kripke
Sound and complete sets of inference 
rules in Modal Logic Axiomatics
• Refresher:
remember that 
1. A set of inference rules (i.e. an inference procedure) 
is sound if everything it concludes is true
2. A set of inference rules (i.e. an inference procedure) 
is complete if it can find all true sentences
• Theorem:
System K is sound and complete for the class of all 
Kripke models.
Multiple Modal Operators
• We can define a modal logic with n modal 
operators 1, …, n as follows:
1. We would have a single set of worlds W
2. n accessibility relations R1, …, Rn
3. Semantics of each i is defined in terms of Ri
Powerful concept – many 
accessibility relations
Axiomatic 
theory of the 
knowledge logic
(epistemic logic)  
Axiomatic theory of the knowledge logic
• Objective: Come up with a sound and 
complete axiom system for the partition 
model of knowledge.
• Note: This corresponds to a more restricted 
set of models than the set of all Kripke
models.
• In other words, we will need more axioms.
Axiomatic theory of the knowledge logic
1. The modal operator i becomes Ki
2. Worlds accessible from w according to Ri are those 
indistinguishable to agent i from world w
3. Ki means “agent i knows that”
4. Start with the simple axioms:
1. (Classical) All propositional tautologies are valid
2. (Modus Ponens) if  and  are valid, infer that  is 
valid
Ki means “agent i knows that”
Now we are defining a logic of knowledge 
on top of standard modal logic.
Axiomatic theory of the knowledge logic
(More Axioms)
• (K) From (Ki  Ki()) infer Ki
– Means that the agent knows all the consequences 
of his knowledge
– This is also known as logical omniscience
• (Necessitation) From , infer that Ki
– Means that the agent knows all propositional 
tautologies
In a sense, these agents are inhuman, they are more like 
God, which started this whole area of research
Remember, 
we introduced 
the rule K
This defines 
some logicSo far, axioms were like in alethic modal logic
Axiomatic theory of the knowledge logic 
(Now we add More Axioms)
• Axiom (D)  Ki (  )
– This is called the axiom of consistency
• Axiom (T) (Ki)
– This is called the veridity axiom
– Means that if an agent knows something than  is 
true.
– Corresponds to assuming that accessability
relation  Ri is reflexive
Axiom D means that nobody can 
know nonsense, inconsistency Remember symbols D and T of 
axioms, each of them will be used to 
create some type of logic
Refresher: what is Euclidean 
relation?
• Binary relation R over domain Y is Euclidian
– if and only if 
– y, y’, y’’  Y, if (y,y’)  R and (y,y’’)  R then (y’,y’’)  R
• (y,y’)  R and (y,y’’)  R then (y’,y’’)  R
y y’R
y’’
R
y y’R
y’’
R R
• Axiom (4) Ki  Ki Ki
– Called the positive introspection axiom
– Corresponds to assuming that Ri is transitive
• Axiom (5) Ki  KiKi
– Called the negative introspection axiom
– Corresponds to assuming that Ri is Euclidian
Remember symbols 4 and 5 of 
axioms, each of them will be used to 
create some type of logic
Axiomatic theory of the knowledge logic 
(Now we add More Axioms)
Overview of Axioms of Epistemic Logic 
1. Proposition: a binary relation is an equivalence relation if and only if it is reflexive, 
transitive and Euclidean
2. Proposition: a binary relation is an equivalence relation if and only if it is reflexive, 
transitive and symmetric
Table. Axioms and corresponding constraints on the accessibility relation.
Some modal logic systems take only a subset of this set. All  general , problem independent 
theorems can be derived from only these axioms and some  additional, problem specific axioms 
describing the given puzzle, game or research problem.
Logics of 
knowledge and 
belief
FOL augmented with two modal operators
K(a,) - a knows 
B(a,) - a believes 
 Associate with each agent a set of possible worlds
 Mk =<W, L, R> W - a set of worlds
L:W  P() - set of formula true in a world, R  A x W X W
 An agent knows/believes a propositions in a given world if the 
proposition holds in all worlds accessible to the agent from the 
given world
B(Bill, father-of(Zeus, Cronos))
? B(Bill, father-of(Jupiter,Saturn))
referential opaque operators
 The difference between B and K is given by their properties
Logics of knowledge and belief
Properties of knowledge
(A1) Distribution axiom K(a, )  K(a,  )  K(a, )
(A2) Knowledge axiom K(a, ) 
- satisfied if R is reflexive
(A3) Positive introspection axiom K(a, )  K(a, K(a, ))
- satisfied if R is transitive
(A4) Negative introspection axiom
K(a, )  K(a, K(a, ))
- satisfied if R is euclidian
We are back to 
Muddy Children…
1. We will formulate now a completely formal 
modal (knowledge) logic, language based 
formulation of Muddy Children
Two Muddy Children problem
(1) A and B know that each can see the other's forehead. 
Thus, for example:
(1a) If A does not have a muddy spot, B will know that A 
does not have a muddy spot
(1b) A knows (1a)
(2) A and B each know that at least one of them have a 
muddy spot, and they each know that the other knows 
that. In particular
(2a) A knows that B knows that either A or B has a 
muddy spot
(3) B says that he does not know whether he has a muddy 
spot, and A thereby knows that B does not know
Two Muddy Children problem
(1) A and B know that each can see the other's forehead. Thus, for example:
(1a) If A does not have a muddy spot, B will know that A does not have a muddy spot
(1b) A knows (1a)
(2) A and B each know that at least one of them have a muddy spot, and they each know 
that the other knows that. In particular
(2a) A knows that B knows that either A or B has a muddy spot
(3) B says that he does not know whether he has a muddy spot, and A thereby knows 
that B does not know
1.  KA( muddy(A)  KB( muddy(A)) (1b)
2.  KA(KB(muddy(A)  muddy(B))) (2a)
3.  KA(KB(muddy(B))) (3)
4. muddy(A)  KB(muddy(A)) 1, A2 A2: K(a, )  
5.  KB(muddy(A)  muddy(B)) 2, A2
6.  KB(muddy(A))  KB(muddy(B)) 5, A1 A1: K(a, )  K(a,   )  K(a, )
7. muddy(A)  KB(muddy(B)) 4, 6
8. KB(muddy(B))  muddy(A) contrapositive of 7
9.  KA(muddy(A)) 3, 8, R2
Proof
3.  KA(KB(muddy(B)))  (3)
5.  KB(muddy(A)  muddy(B))
7. muddy(A)  KB(muddy(B))
2.  KA(KB(muddy(A)  muddy(B))) (2a)
1.  KA( muddy(A)  KB( muddy(A)) (1b)
4. muddy(A)  KB(muddy(A))
A2: K(a, )  
6.  KB(muddy(A))  KB(muddy(B))
A1: K(a, )  K(a,   )  K(a, )
8. KB(muddy(B))  muddy(A)
9.  KA(muddy(A))
(R2) Logical omniscience
   and K(a, )  infer K(a, )
Two muddy children in Epistemic Logic
Three Muddy Children –
Formulation in Logic with time
• LANGUAGE
1. Muddy(x) = agent X has a mud on his forehead, a1, a2, a3 
2. Speak(x,t) = X states the color on time T
3. t+1 = successor of time T
4. 0 = starting time
5. Know(x, p, t) = agent X knows P at time T
6. Know-whether(x, p, t) = agent X knows at time T whether P 
holds
Axioms
W1. know-whether(x,p,t)  [know(x,p,t)  know(x,p,t) 
• definition of know-whether: X knows whether P if he either knows 
P or he knows not P
W2. speak (x,p,t)  know-whether(x, muddy(x), t) 
• a child declares the color muddy on his head iff he knows what it is
Three Muddy Children – Formulation in Logic 
with time (cont)
W3.  x  y  know-whether(x, muddy(y), t ) 
• The child can see the color on everyone else’s head
W4. know-color(x, t)  speak (x, t)
• The children speak as soon as they figure the color out
W5. know-whether (y, speak (x, t), t+1)
• Each child knows what has been spoken
W6. know(x,p,t)  know(x,p,t+1) 
• children do not forget what they know.
W7. know(x , muddy(a1)  muddy(a2)  muddy(a3)  , t)
• The children know that at least one of them has a muddy 
head
W8. If p is an instance of W1 – W.8 then know(x, p, t)
• Lemma. If P is a theorem (can be inferred from 1-5, W.1 – W.8 then 
know(x, p, t)
• Proof. Induction on length of inference (2,3, W.8)
• Lemma 1A. 
•  muddy(a2)   muddy(a3)  speak (a1, 0)
• Proof. 
1. From W.7, a2 knows that either a1, a2 or a3 has mud.
2. From W.3 and 1, a1 knows that neither a2 nor a3 has mud.
3. From 2 and 3, a2 knows that a1 has  mud.
4. From W.2, a1 will speak
• Analogously
• Lemma 1.B.  muddy(a1)   muddy(a3)  speak(a2,0)
• Lemma 1.C.  muddy(a1)   muddy(a2)  speak(a3,0)
Similarly all cases can be proved
And now a test…
• Next slide has a problem formulation of a relatively not 
difficult but not trivial problem in modal logic.
• Please try to solve it by yourself, not looking to my solution.
• If you want, you can look to internet for examples of 
theorems in modal logic that you can use in addition to 
those that are in my slides.  I do not know if this would help 
to find a better solution but I would be interested in all 
what you get.
• Good luck. You can use system BK, or any other system of 
modal logic from these slides.
This I give to my students ;-))
Ge
1. Given is system BK of modal logic with all its axioms, 
theorems, and proof methods
2. Given are two axioms:
• A axiom
• L axiom
3. Prove that Ge
A Axiom: Ge  Necessarily (Ge) 
L Axiom: Possible (Ge)
Example of proving 
in Modal Logic
Do not look to the next slide with the 
solution!!!
X Necessarily(X)
Necessarily (Ge  Necessarily(Ge) )
Possible(Ge)  Possible (Necessarily(Ge))
Modal Logic thesis: 
Necessarily(p  q) 
(Possible(p)  Possible(q)),
Thesis specific to BK system of modal logic: 
Possible( Necessarily (p) ) p                
Possible(Ge)  Ge
L Axiom: Possible (Ge)
Ge
A Axiom: Ge  Necessarily (G) 
System BK of modal logic is used
p=Ge
q= Necessarily(Ge)
X = Ge  Necessarily (Ge)
4
1
2
Possible( Necessarily (Ge) ) Ge
p = Ge
3
5
Here is the solution.
Do you know that you proved that 
God exists?
This is a famous proof of Hartshorne, 
which resurrected interest among 
analytic philosophers in proofs of 
God’s Existence. See next slide.
Ge or “God Exists”?
• Amazingly, when I showed the proof from last 
slide to some people, they told me “OK”.
• When I showed them the next slide, and I 
claimed that the proof proves God’s existence, 
they protested.
Can you explain me why?
X Necessarily(X) AA  
Necessarily (God_exists  Necessarily(God_exists) )
Possible(God_exists)  Possible (Necessarily(God_exists))
Modal Logic thesis: 
Necessarily(p  q) 
(Possible(p)  Possible(q)),
Thesis specific to BK system of modal logic: 
Possible( Necessarily (p) ) p                
Possible(God_exists)  God_exists
Leibnitz Axiom: Possible (God_Exists)
God _exists
Anselm Axiom: God_exists 
Necessarily (God_exists) 
System BK of modal logic is used
p=God_exists
q= Necessarily(God_exists)
X = God_exists  Necessarily (God_exists)
4
1
2
Possible( Necessarily (God_exists) ) God_exists
p = God_exists
3
5
This is the same proof, the same 
axioms. We only give the historical 
assumptions. Axiom A is from Saint 
Anselm – it is like if Pythagoras invents 
his theorem in his head – then the 
theorem is true in any World. Axiom L 
comes from Leibniz – “we can create a 
consistent model of God in our head”.
Can we invent a puzzle 
like Muddy Children with 
these axioms?
We will give more examples to 
motivate you to modal logic using 
puzzles and games
More examples to motivate 
thinking about models and 
modal logic.
Research areas 
and Problems in 
nuSMV
1. Games:
1. Policemen and bandits in Oregon
2. Law:
1. Police rules of engagement in Oregon
3. Morality stories:
1. Narrow Bridge
2. Robot theatre – Paradise Lost – Adam, 
Eve and Satan in Modal Logic
4. Robot morality
1. Military robots
2. Old lady helper robot
5. Hardware verification – arbiters, 
counters.
Research areas 
and Problems in 
nuSMV
1. Software verification
2. Mathematics
3. Theology:
1. Proofs of God existence
2. Proofs of Satan existence
3. Free will
4. Analytic Philosophy
5. Logic Puzzles
6. Logic Paradoxes
7. Planning of experiments
Temporal Logic
Computational Tree 
Logic
State Explosion Problem
• Explosion as a 
result of 
interaction of 
several 
systems
The concept of Computation Tree
• Finite set of states; Some 
are initial states
• Total transition relation: 
every state has at least 
one next state i.e. infinite 
paths
• There is a set of basic 
environmental variables 
or features (“atomic 
propositions”)
• In each state, some 
atomic propositions are 
true
G0
G1
S
G2
M G1
S
G2
M
G
0
G0
G1
S
G2
G
0
G0
G1
S G1
G
0
G0
G1
S
M
M M M
M
[a] model
[b] tree for this model
CTL Notation
Computation Tree Logic: CTL
• Every operator F, G, X, U preceded by A or E
• Universal modalities:
p p
p
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
AG p
p p p p
p
p p
AF p
necessary possible
CTL, cont... Existential Modalities
• Existential modalities:
p
p
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
EG p
p p
EF p
Necessary G in one world
Possible  F in one world
Living in all possible worlds
1. Universe is a set of worlds
2. Each world is characterized by a set of binary properties
3. Each world is characterized by geometrical location.
4. There are rules how properties are change going from world to 
world.
5. Some worlds are accessible from other worlds, depending on 
constraints and geometry.
6. Guns, weapons, keys, tools, knowledge, secret words, etc. to go 
from world to world.
7. Examples are:
1. Robot world
2. Digital system
3. Computer game
4. Law system
5. Moral System
Example of 
robot problem-
solving
Robot in Labirynth to 
reach safe in bank
ab\cd
00 01 11 10
00
01
11
10
A = has a gun for self-protection
B = power (energy)
C = knowledge
D = has a key to the safe
0000
0100
South
1100
south
1101
east
1000
south
1001
Dead end
Robot in initial state
0101
North
0001 0111
1111
Safe in bank 
reached with key to 
lock present
0011
0010
0110
111010101111 1011
walls
Gets a 
gun
Energy 
level
Knowledge level
Gets a 
key to 
the safe
east
south
East East  
North
Safe in bank 
reached
westNorth
East  
South  
South  
South  
Needs a gun 
to go east
Needs to drop a key, 
being  searched by police 
1. Games
2. Computer action 
games
3. Robot path planning
4. Robot in real 
environment
Example of 
human life 
metaphor 
for robot theatre
Path to God Universe 
with many worlds
ab\cd
00 01 11 10
00
01
11
10
A = goodness
B = power
C = knowledge
D = beauty
0000
0100
Power+
1100
Goodness +
1101
Beauty +
1000
Power-
Beauty -
1001
Dead end
Human is born
0101
Goodness-
0001 0111
1111
Illumination
0011
0010
0110
111010101111 1011
constraints
goodness power knowledge
beauty
Knowledge+
Goodness+
Goodness+
Beauty + Knowledge+
Power-
Power+
Illumination
Power-Beauty +Power+
1. Robot 
morality
2. Robot 
theatre
EXAMPLE:
The Narrow Bridge 
Universe
Can we create a world with no evil?
• Most of games are based on killing enemy (chess, 
checkers)
• We propose a game to win by cooperation to 
save lives in a Universe with limited resources.
• This is my initial design of the game and you are 
all welcome to extend, improve and program it.
• This will be an application of CTL logic, the same 
logic as used by Terrance and Lawrance and 
industrial companies to verify hardware.
The Narrow Bridge Problem
1. There are two kinds of people, Meaties and Vegies.
2. Meaties can eat only meat, Vegies can eat only vegetables.
3. Meaties live in North, Vegies live in South.
4. There is no meat in North.
5. There is abundance of meat in South
6. There is no vegetables in South
7. There is abundance of vegetables in North.
8. To move to North Vegies have to go through narrow bridge
9. To move to South Meaties have to go through the same bridge.
10. If there are two humans in the same cell (place) on the bridge, then they must shoot. Otherwise they may 
not.
11. If there are two humans in neighbor cells they may shoot or not.
12. The human (Meatie or Vegie) can either kill a human in the same place, do nothing or go to other location.
13. Meaties are obedient to General_Meat
14. Vegies are obedient to General_Vegie
15. If  both armies do nothing, they will all die from starvation.
16. Some life sacrifice may be necessary to save more lives.
17. Worth of my soldier is worthy 1 to general, life of one enemy  soldier is worth ½ to him
What is the best strategy that will save the maximum of human lives?
Example of 
solution
Four Meaties
in North
Four Vegies
in South
Mutual kill
Mutual kill
start
Meaties
undrestand
to not 
attack
Vegie
undrestands
to not attack
start
Ultimately two Meaties
and two Vegies survive
start
1. As a result of some (evolved, agreed and 
thought out) late agreement between 
generals, two Meaties and two Vegies will 
survive.
2. Can we find a scenario in which more 
humans will survive?
1. Are the rules of this Universe such that the 
best one can do is to sacrifice  4+4 – (2+2) = 4 
people?
2. Can we sacrifice less?
Self-Sacrifice
• Observe that one of strategies to have the 
minimum death is the general sacrifice at the 
very beginning three of his soldiers.
• He gives hint to the “enemy” that he is not 
willing to fight for the sake of fighting, just to 
fight as a necessity for survival.
Four Meaties
in North
Four Vegies
in South
Self-sacrifice Self-sacrifice
Self-sacrifice
start
With maximum 
sacrifice of Meaties a 
total of five lives were 
saved
start
Problems to solve for students
1. Program this world in nuSMV
2. If we change slightly the rules of the game or the 
geometry of the universe’s land, can we save more 
lives?
3. How to design the game so that no lives can be 
saved?
4. How to design the game so that only one life will be 
lost?
5. How can we design the game that only self-sacrifice 
will be the best solution?
Assistive Care robots
1. How much trust you need to be in arms of a strong big robot like this?
2. How to build this trust?
3. What kind morality you would expect from this robot?
R. Capurro: Cybernics Salon
135
using robots that monitor the health of older 
people in Japan
„Japan could save 2.1 trillion yen ($21 billion) of 
elderly insurance payments in 2025 by using 
robots that monitor the health of older 
people, so they don't have to rely on human 
nursing care, the foundation said in its report.
All these morality systems lead to 
contradictions and paradoxes
1. Moral is what is not forbidden.
2. Moral is what is ordered by law in this 
situation.
3. Moral is what is done in good intentions.
4. Moral is what brings good results.
5. Moral is everything when human is not 
used as and object (Kant).
6. Love and do what you want.
The system should have a combinations of 
morality logics and a “situation recognizer”
Robots and War
1. Congress: one-third of all combat vehicles to be 
robots by 2015
2. Future Combat System (FCS) Development cost by 
2014: $130-$250 billion

A proof of Ob(bomb) given the 
knowledge-base at t2. 
Only premise 3 differs.
At t1, R's knowledge-base 
contained C(bomb), but a
At t2 knowledge-base contains 
C(bomb).
Using Formal Verification and 
Robotic Evolution Techniques to 
Find Contradictions in Laws 
Concerning Police Rules of 
Engagement
Terrance Sun and Lawrence Sun
Police and Law 
• In this project we used formal verification and robot programming 
techniques to validate and find contradictions in laws that govern police 
use of force.
• A model of police officers and bystanders in a robot “game” using the 
NuSMV software and development language.
• Temporal logic
• We inserted statutes and case law into our model to dictate the 
behaviors of the actors, in the process developing a formal method of 
translating laws into operational predicate modal logic clauses. 
• Finally, we run a process to check through the computation tree to find 
contradictions.
• Our final results found several contradictions, some of them obvious 
enough to be used as argument in real court cases, and suggest the 
legal code should be seriously cleaned up so as to prevent confusion 
and uncertainty. 
1.2.1 Police Use of Force
• We selected Police Rules of Engagement as our focus for this 
project. 
• Police misuse of force, especially shootings, is a controversial topic 
in the United States.
• In the City of Portland, the issue is even more controversial 
because of recent incidents. 
• The beating of James Chasse [6] and the shootings of Aaron 
Campbell [7] and Jack Dale Collins [8], all mentally unstable victims, 
led to calls for stricter regulation on police usage of force.
FROM :  Terrance Sun and Lawrence Sun

Conclusions
1. Superintelligent Agent-based systems will dramatically 
change the world we live in:
1. War
2. Social services
3. Police and Law
4. Industry
5. Entertainment
2. These systems will require all kinds of new logics that are all 
derived from the Modal Logic of Aristotle, St. Anselm, Lewis 
and Kripke.
3. Quantum logic is a modal logic too – quantum systems will 
reason in modal logic and humans will be not able to 
understand and track their reasoning. 
– This will cause serious moral and intellectual issues.
appendices
Main 
Concepts of 
MODAL 
LOGIC
We introduced two modal terms such as impossible and necessary.
In order to define strict implication, that is, we need two new 
symbols,  and .
Given a statement p,
by “p” we mean “It is necessary that p”
and
by “p” we mean “It is possible that p”
Now we can  define strict implication:
p q := ¬(p Λ ¬q)
that is
it is not possible that both p and ¬q are true
Reminder on Modal Strict Implication
Both operators, that of necessity  and that of possibility , can be 
reciprocally defined.
If we take  as primitive, we have:
p := ¬¬p
that is
“it is necessary that p” means 
“it is not possible that  non-p”
Therefore, we can define strict implication as:
p q := (¬p Λ q)
but since p  q is logically equivalent to ¬(p Λ ¬q), or (¬p Λ q), we 
have
p q := (p q)
Reciprocal definitions
Analogously, if we take  as primitive, we have:
p := ¬¬p
that is
“it is possible that p” means
“it is not necessary that  non-p”
And again, from the definition of strict implication 
and the above definition, we can conclude that
p  q := (p  q)
Taking   as primitive
Square of 
Opposition
necessary
p
¬¬p
impossible
¬p
¬p
possible
¬¬p
p
contingent
¬p
¬p
contradictory 
statements
Following Theophrastus (IV century BC), but with 
modern logic operators, we can think of a square of 
opposition in modal terms:
Square of opposition
What is logical Necessity?
1. By logical necessity we do not refer
• either to physical necessity (such as “bodies attract according to 
Newton’s formula”, or “heated metals dilate”) 
• nor philosophical necessity (such as an a priori reason, 
independent from experience, or “cogito ergo sum”).
2. What we have in mind, by contrast, the kind of relationship linking 
premises and conclusion in a mathematical proof, or formal 
deduction:
if the deduction is correct and the premises are true, the conclusion 
is true.
1. In this sense we say that “true mathematical and 
logical statements are necessary”.
2. In Leibniz’s terms, 
1. a necessary statement is true in every possible 
world; 
2. a possible statement is true in at least one of the 
possible worlds.
Necessary is true in every possible 
world
CONTINGENT and POSSIBLE
According to Aristotle, “p is contingent” is to be 
understood as p Λ ¬p.
• Looking at the square of opposition, we can 
interpret “possible” and “contingent”, on the basis 
of their contradictory elements, as purely possible 
and purely contingent:
• purely possible
the contradictory of impossible: ¬¬p
• purely contingent
the contradictory of necessary: ¬p
necessary
p
¬¬p
impossible
¬p
¬p
possible
¬¬p
p
contingent
¬p
¬p
contradictory 
statements
• Looking at the square of opposition, we can interpret “possible” and 
“contingent”, on the basis of their contradictory elements, as purely
possible and purely contingent:
• purely possible
the contradictory of impossible: ¬¬p
• purely contingent
the contradictory of necessary: ¬p
CONTINGENT and POSSIBLE
By contrast, “possible” and “contingent” may be both interpreted as
“what can either be or not be”, 
or else, 
“what is possible but not necessary”:
bilateral contingent, 
or bilateral possible:
p Λ ¬p
or p Λ ¬p
necessary
p
¬¬p
impossible
¬p
¬p
possible
¬¬p
p
contingent
¬p
¬p
Types of 
modalities
NECESSITY OF THE CONSEQUENCE and
NECESSITY OF THE CONSEQUENT
The strict implication, defined as (p  q), is to be 
understood as the necessity to obtain the 
consequence given that antecedent:
necessitas consequentiae
where the consequentia is (p  q)
This must not be confused with the fact that the 
consequent might be necessary:
necessitas consequentis (fallacy: p  q)
where the consequens is q
NECESSITY OF THE CONSEQUENCE and
NECESSITY OF THE CONSEQUENT
Whereas by (p  q) 
we mean that it is logically impossible
that the antecedent is true 
and the consequent false (by definition of strict 
implication),
by p  q
we mean that the antecedent implies the 
necessity of the consequent.
Modality DE DICTO
Whenever we wish to modally characterize the 
quality of a statement (dictum), we speak of 
modality de dicto.
EXAMPLE: “It is necessary that Socrates is rational”
“It is possible that Socrates is bald”
 Rational (Socrates)
 Bald (Socrates)
Statement
Statement
Modality DE RE
By contrast, when we wish to modally characterize 
the way in which a property belongs to something 
(res), we speak of modality de re.
EXAMPLE: “Socrates is necessarily rational”
“Socrates is possibly bald”
Has_Property (Socrates,  Rational )
Has_Property (Socrates,  Bald )
How baldness belongs to Socrates
How rationality belongs to Socrates
Typical Logical Fallacy is to 
confuse modality DE DICTO 
and modality DE RE
The confusion between de dicto and de re
modalities is deceitful, for it leads to a logical 
fallacy.
what is true de dicto is NOT always true de re,
and vice versa
Modality SENSU COMPOSITO 
versus Modality SENSU DIVISO
Let us consider an example by Aristotle himself:
“It is possible that he who sits walks”
If f = “sits”, we may read it either as
( x) (f(x) Λ ¬f(x)) [sensu composito]
or as
( x) (f(x) Λ (¬f(x))) [sensu diviso]
In the former case, the statement is false. 
In the latter, the statement is true:
Modality SENSU COMPOSITO 
versus Modality SENSU DIVISO
Let us consider an example by Aristotle himself:
“It is possible that Socrates is bald and not bald”
If f = “sits”, we may read it either as
( S) (bald(S) Λ ¬bald(S)) [sensu composito]
or as
( S) (f(S) Λ (¬f(S))) [sensu diviso]
In the former case, the statement is false. 
In the latter, the statement is true:
“Socrates is (possibly) bald and non-bald”, 
Modality SENSU COMPOSITO / 
Modality SENSU DIVISO
“It is possible that Socrates is (bald 
and non-bald)”, which is false.
“Socrates is (possibly) bald and non-
bald”, which is true.
Sometimes the distinction de re/de dicto coincides
with sensu composito / sensu diviso.
Meaning of 
Entailment
Meaning of Entailment
Part of the Definition of entailment relation :
1. M,w |=  if  is true in w
2. M,w |=    if M,w |=  and M,w |= 
Entailment says what we 
can deduce about state of 
world, what is true in 
them.
If there are two formulas that are 
true in some world w than a logic 
AND of these formulas is also true 
in this world.
Given 
Kripke
model 
with 
state w
state w
formula
Semantics of Modal Logic: Definition of Entailment
• A Kripke model is a pair M,w where
– M = (W, R) is a Kripke structure and 
– w  W is a world
• The entailment relation is defined as follows:
1. M,w |=  if  is true in w
2. M,w |=    if M,w |=  and M,w |= 
3. M,w |=  if and only if we do not have M,w |= 
4. M,w |=  if and only if w’  W such that 
R(w,w’) we have M,w’ |= 
Definition of Kripke Model
Definition of Entailment Relation in  Kripke Model
Kripke
Structure A world
accessibility relation over W
It is true in every word that 
is accessible from  world w
Satisfiable formulas in Kripke models 
for modal logic
1. In classical logic we have the concept of valid 
formulas and satisfiable formulas.
2. In modal logic it is the same as in classical logic:
– Any formula  is valid (written |= ) if and only if 
is true in all Kripke models
E.g.    is valid
– Any formula  is satisfiable if and only if  is true in 
some Kripke models
3. We write M, |=  if  is true in all worlds of M
Relation to classical satisfiability and entailment
1. For a particular set of propositional constants P, a 
Kripke model is a three-tuple <W, R, V> . 
1. W is the set of worlds. 
2. R is a subset of W × W, which defines a directed graph 
over W.
3. V maps each propositional constant to the set of worlds in 
which it is true. 
2. Conceptually, a Kripke model is a directed graph 
where each node is a propositional model.
3. Given a Kripke model M = <W,R, V> , each world w 
 W corresponds to a propositional model: 
1. it says which propositions are true in that world.
2. In each such world, satisfaction for propositional logic is 
defined as usual. 
4. Satisfaction is also defined at each world for and 
 , and this is where R is important.
5. A sentence is possibly true at a particular world 
whenever the sentence is true in one of the worlds 
adjacent to that world in the graph defined by R.
W1
W2
W3
W4
P,s P,s
r
s, r
Relation to classical satisfiability and entailment
1. Satisfiability can also be defined without reference 
to a particular world and is often called global 
satisfiability. 
2. A sentence  is globally satisfied by model M = 
<W,R, V> exactly when for every world w  W it is 
the case that |=M,w . 
3. Entailment in modal logic is defined as usual:
– “ the premises  logically entail the conclusion 
whenever every Kripke model that satisfies  also 
satisfies .”
Please observe that I talk about every Kripke model and not every 
world of one Kripke Model
Predicate Modal 
Logic System and 
examples of 
axiomatics
What to do with the modal logic 
axioms?
Now that we have these axioms, we can 
take some of their sets , add them to 
classical logic axioms and create new 
modal logics.
The most used is system K45
Axiomatic theory of the partition model (back to 
the partition model)
1. System KT45 exactly captures the properties 
of knowledge defined in the partition model
2. System KT45 is also known as system S5
3. S5 is sound and complete for the class of all 
partition models
modern version of S5 invented by Bjorssberg
1. This logic is used for automated and semi-automated:
1. proof design, 
2. discovery, 
3. and verification.
2. This logic was formalized and implemented in system X.
3. This tool comes from Computational Logic Technologies. 
4. We now review this version of S5. 
5. Since S5 subsumes the propositional calculus, we review this primitive 
system as well. 
6. And in addition, since in LRT*  quantification over propositional variables is 
allowed, we review the predicate calculus (= first-order logic) as well.
Modern Versions of the Propositional and 
Predicate Calculi, and Lewis' S5
1. Presented  version of S5, as well as the other proof systems 
available in X, use an ”accounting system“ related to the 
system described by Suppes (1957). 
2. In such systems, each line in a proof is established with 
respect to some set of assumptions.
1. an “Assume" inference rule, which cites no premises, is used to 
justify a formulae ' with respect to the set of assumptions {}. 
3. Unless otherwise specified, the formulae justified by other 
inference rules have as their set of assumptions the union of 
the sets of assumptions of their premises. 
4. Some inference rules, e.g., conditional introduction, justify 
formulae while discharging assumptions.
necessity count in modal logics T, S4 
and S5
1. The accounting approach can be applied to keep track of other 
properties or attributes in a proof. 
2. Proof steps in X for modal systems keep a “necessity count" which 
indicates how many times necessity introduction may be applied. 
3. While assumption tracking remains the same through various proof 
systems, and a formula's assumptions are determined just by its 
supporting inference rule, necessity counting varies between different 
modal systems (e.g., T, S4, and S5). 
4. In fact, in X, the differences between T, S4, and S5, are determined 
entirely by variations in necessity counting.
5. In X, a formula's necessity count is a non-negative integer, or inf, and 
the default propagation scheme is that a formula's necessity count is 
the minimum of its premises' necessity counts.
The exceptional rules for systems T, 
S4, and S5
• The exceptional rules are as follows: 
– (i) a formula justified by necessity elimination has a necessity 
count one greater than its premise; 
– (ii) a formula justified by necessity introduction has a necessity 
count is one less than its premise;
– (iii) any theorem (i.e., a formula derived with no assumptions) 
has an infinite necessity count. 
• The variations in necessity counting that produce T, S4, and 
S5, are as follows:
– in T, a formula has a necessity count of 0, unless any of the 
conditions (i{iii) above apply; 
– S4 is as T, except that every necessity has an infinite necessity 
count; 
– S5 is as S4, except that every modal formula (i.e., every necessity 
and possibility) has an infinite necessity count.
A proof in the propositional calculus 
(p \/  q)   q from p. 
Assumption 4 is
discharged by  elimination in step 
6; 
assumption 7 by  introduction in 
step 7.
Figure demonstrates
p |-PC (p \/  q)   q,
that is, it illustrates a proof of ( p \/  q)   q from 
the premise p. 
Gentzen-style
 introduction
Example of proof in 
propositional logic
We add introduction rules and elimination rules for 
the modal operators
1. The modal proof systems add 
1. introduction rules and 
2. elimination rules 
for the modal operators 
2. Since LRT*  is based on S5, a more involved S5 proof is given in next 
slide
3. The proof shown therein also demonstrates the use of rules based on 
machine reasoning systems that act as oracles for certain proof 
systems. 
4. For instance, 
1. the rule “PC " uses an automated theorem prover
2. to search for a proof in the propositional calculus
3. of its conclusion from its premises.
Note the use of “PC |- " and
“S5 |- " which check 
inferences by using 
machine reasoning systems 
integrated with X. 
• “PC |- " serves as an oracle 
for the propositional 
calculus, 
“S5 |- " for S5.
1. We assume the negation of what we want to prove
A modal  proof in S5 demonstrating 
that (A  B) \/ (B   A). 
